tl;dr

• The patch adds a vulnerable virtio device
• The device accesses pointers without bound check
• Abuse OOB pointer access to setup arb r/w primitive
• Craft open,read,write ropchain on heap
• Overwrite virtqueue handler with stack pivoting gadget

tl;dr

• Sanitizing request causes null byte overflow which corrupts type
• Processing corrupted request doesn’t remove it from incoming_queue
• Reaping corrupted request still leaves it in incoming_queue causing UAF
• Setup crosscache to abuse UAF
• UAF provides free primitive through double reset

tl;dr

• Capturing the flag id through redos attack in /search endpoint
• XSS in /uuid/noteid/raw and HTML injection in /uuid/noteid
• CSP frame-src bypass through server side redirect

tl;dr

• Implemented two SEH and two VEH Exception Handlers
• Two stage malware challenge with process injection technique
• CPP binary where logic is wrapped in classes and their member functions

tl;dr

• Giving custom array size of NaN, passes checks while allowing OOB r/w
• Use OOB r/w to get libc, stack (environ) addresses
• Craft fake chunk on array and overwrite fastbin fd
• Reset machine to allocate register context on fake chunk
• Overwrite VM sp with real stack
• Push ropchain onto stack and halt VM to execute ropchain

tl;dr

• Giving size > 48 causes heap OOB r/w of 16 bytes
• Use OOB r/w get leaks and overwrite objects for rip control

tl;dr

• Simple typer bug, range of BitAnd opcode is assumed to be [1, operand] when in reality it is [0, operand].
• Use range assumptions to create unchecked integer underflow.
• Bypass array bounds checks and obtain OOB write, overwrite size of array to get overlap.
• Use double & object array overlap to create addrOf & fakeObj primitives.
• Create overlapping fake array using StructureID leak to obtain arbitrary R/W.